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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a management case study which describes the implementation of the
Navy's Rapid Acquisition of Manufactured Parts (RAMP) program. The RAMP
program was implemented in 1989 by the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP)
to address the problems in procurement of spare parts for the Navy's weapon systems.
RAMP technology proposed the use of flexible manufacturing systems and computer
integrated manufacturing (CIM) capability to develop self-contained computerized
manufacturing cells used to produce small machined parts and printed wire assemblies.
The goal of RAMP was to develop and use computerized parts specifications to reduce
lead time and cost for manufactured spare parts.
This management case study concentrates on the examination of how new technology
is implemented into current established organizations. The main focus is on the
relationships between the navy commands involved in the implementation: the Navy
RAMP sites and the Inventory Control Points (Aviation Support Office and Ships Parts
Control Center). The case includes the background and a description of the program,
strategic planning, key players, identification of parts, establishment of technical data,
cost and competition issues, and the steps taken to organize and implement RAMP
technology. Teaching notes are included which identify the important issues of the case
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This case study examines the implementation of the Rapid
Acquisition of Manufactured Parts (RAMP) Program. The RAMP
program was funded by the Naval Supply Systems Command
(NAVSUP) as a research and development program in the early
1980's to address problems in the procurement of spare parts
for Navy weapons systems. A substantial number of spare parts
for older weapon systems were proving highly expensive to
procure in small quantities and had extremely long lead times
(sometimes over a year). The RAMP program was designed to use
flexible manufacturing systems and computer integrated
manufacturing to create a computer cell to manufacture these
parts quickly and at a far lower cost.
The case covers the actual implementation process as the
RAMP computer cells were established at various Navy commands.
A previous case, The Navy's RAMP Program (Burton, 1990),
described in detail the problems of procurement of these spare
parts and the development of the RAMP technology. This case
is a follow up case to examine implementation of the program
and its current status. The issues covered include strategic
planning, management control systems, and program development
techniques.
The case is presented from the point of view of the RAMP
Implementation Manager at NAVSUP, Barney Farley. It details
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Farley's approach to the implementation from the early stages
through the establishment of the RAMP cells at selected Navy
commands. The case is structured chronologically, outlining
the background, the issues and the steps taken to promote a
cohesive implementation.
The background of the case includes how the program came
about, who provided the funding and the contractors involved.
It describes the RAMP program itself and how it works.
Additionally, the formal implementation plan is outlined which
covers the goals, scope and milestones of the program.
Because RAMP involved several diverse and geographically
dispersed commands, the organizations involved in the program
are profiled in some detail. The funding commands,
procurement commands and RAMP site commands and their
relationship to each other are defined. The internal
processes of these commands as they relate to the RAMP program
are also described.
The main issues of the case became apparent to the
implementers of the RAMP program in the early stages of
testing the RAMP cell. Most of the issues deal with how the
procurement commands and the RAMP sites must work together to
implement the program. The initial difficulty was finding the
spare parts which the RAMP program was designed to
manufacture. This led to a crucial issue of the case: the
lack of technical data. The developers of the RAMP program
assumed adequate technical data was available on spare parts
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to put into a computeri7ed parts specification data base.
Unfortunately, complete technical data was not always
available - particularly on the parts which the RAMP program
was designed to manufacture. Additionally, the bid process
between the procurement command- and the RAMP sites was not
clearly established. The bid procedures and communication
between the procurement commands and the RAMP sites was
initially ineffective. Several internal organizational
issues, such as competition, cost, lead time and funding
procedures, also affected the implementation.
The case goes on to describe some of the steps taken by
Farley to rectify these initial problems. One of these steps
was the institution of several workload conferences which were
conducted throughout 1990, 1991 and 1992. The conferences
were attended by the commands involved with RAMP
implementation. The issues discussed and outcomes of these
conferences are described. Additionally, the planned
implementation of an electronic data system by the original
RAMP contractors is discussed and examined. The case
concludes with the current status of the program and an
implied question: what next?
In addition to the case, teaching notes are provided.
While the case presents specific issues relating to RAMP, the
teaching notes detail more generalized problem areas dealing
with implementation of new technology.
3
The implementation of RAMP provides an illustration of the
use of strategic planning and management control techniques.
The large number of commands and staff involved make the
implementation particularly difficult. The case demonstrates
that the introduction of a new technology must involve not
only the technology, but how to make it work.
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II. CASE STUDY
Barney Farley put his phone down, on a cool day in
November 1991. "The whole thing is falling apart," he thought.
The program he had worked on for nearly five years, the
program he was sure would solve many of the spare parts
problems in the Navy, was simply not working.
He thought back to when he had first heard ot RAMP
technology - he was certain that this new technology was the
wave of the future. And he was determined to see that the
Navy was on the cutting edge of that technology. Now, after
years of effort, time and money, the program was simply not
living up to expectations.
The sites where RAMP had been implemented were not
anywhere near capacity; the orders just were not coming in.
And despite a successful workload conference in August, Farley
just found out that 60 percent of the parts on contract by one
customer had just been canceled due to defense budget cu:s.
"What next?," he wondered, "how can we make it work?"
A. BACKGROUND
The Rapid Acquisition of Manufactured Parts (RAMP) program
was initiatid in 1985 by the Naval Supply Systems Command
(NAVSUP) to addiess problems in the procurement of spare parts
for Navy weapons systems. Many of these parts were proving
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highly expensive to maintain in surply system inventories or
obtain from contractors after the weapons systems were out of
production.
The RAMP program was instigated under a research and
development letter contract in 1985 by a quasi-governmental
agency in South Carolina called the South Carolina Research
Authority (SCRA). In late 1987, the staff at SCRA made their
initial recommendation to establish RAMP prototype cells. At
this point, supporters of the program at NAVSUP in conjunction
with the staffs at the Navy Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) and
the Navy Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), assessed their
manufacturing needs based on the dollars available to support
this new technology.
In December 1987, the staif at NAVSUP awarded the current
RAMP contract to the South Carolina Research Authority (SCRA).
This contract provided over $60 million through FY 92 to set
up RAMP sites. The staff at SCRA also established the
American Manufacturing Research Consortium, composed of
several leading-edge manufacturing/engineering companies, to
aid in the development of prototype RAMP cells.
B. WHAT IS RAMP?
Barney Farley was appointed RAMP Program Implementation
Manager in November 1986. At that point, the RAMP prototype
had been researched by SCRA and funded by the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) through NAVSUP. Farley's job was to develop
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an implementation plan and oversee the Navy site integration
aspects of the new program.
Farley had been working in Navy commands most of his
career. His initial experience had been in San Diego working
at Naval Aviation Depot, North Island and the Naval
Electronics Systems Command. He then moved to NAVSUP in 1978,
provisioning ships. From 1980 - 1985, he worked at Ships
Parts Control Center in Pennsylvania on repairables. Farley
moved back to NAVSUP in 1985 and was involved extensively in
programs dealing with reduction of turn-around time for spare
part inventories.
In January 1985, he was appointed to the Streamlining the
Acquisition Process Group established by the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy. When Farley heard about the impending
RAMP program, he believed that the new technology was just
what the Navy needed to address many of the spare parts
problems in the supply system.
At that time (and currently), many of the spare parts for
weapons systems were out of production and difficult to obtain
from contractors. This made weapons systems on board ships
and aircraft essentially inoperable. The Navy had to
compensate for this by increasing procurement quantities and
establishing "workarounds" such as cannibalizing existing
systems. Most of these parts were usually expensive to
manufacture and required extremely long lead times. In most
cases, only small quantities of the parts were needed. For
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example, prior to the implementation of RAMP, conventional
lead times on Air Launch and Recovery Equipment (ALRE)
averaged 400 days with costs ranging from $500 to $1400. The
goal of RAMP technology was to reduce these lead times to
approximately 60 days and reduce costs to a range of $300 to
700.
The RAMP program was designed to address many of these
problems. The RAMP contractors at SCRA developed compucer
cell prototypes which could manufacture either printed wire
assemblies (PWA) or small mechanical parts (SMP) through the
use of flexible manufacturing and CIM technology. Each cell
(either PWA or SMP) would be able to manufacture parts from
technical data in far less time than traditional manufacturing
methods. Specifications on a particular part were fed into
the RAMP computer. The RAMP cell would then actually trigger
the production of a part. An operator would be needed only to
monitor the system and make minor adjustments if necessary.
Technical data were a key element in the RAMP process. In
order for the RAMP cell to manufacture a part, complete
technical information was necessary. The RAMP contractors at
SCRA assumed that parts specifications would be available to
convert the technical data of a part into a common machine-
readable format called Product Data Exchange Specification
(PDES). Sites would be set up that could convert traditional
parts specifications into PDES format to be used by the RAMP
cells.
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Farley believed the RAMP program would ease many of the
spare part problems by establishing the technology to produce
these parts quickly and efficiently. The cost savings
generated by the reduction of inventory and lead times should
easily justify the initial investment. To maximize the cost
benefits, however, Farley was looking for parts which fit
certain criteria: 1) difficult to obtain, 2) expensive to
manufacture, 3) long lead times required, and 4) small
quantities. His job would be to not only get the program
implemented, but be able to justify the program and quantify
these cost savings.
C. STRATEGIC PLANNING
One of Farley's first goals, upon acceptance of the NAVSUP
position as RAMP Implementation Manager, was to ensure The
Rapid Acquisition of Manufactured Parts Strategic Plan, 1989-
2010 was written and published in response to a congressional
request in the FY 89 Defense Authorization Act. This plan was
forwarded to Congress in March 1989 with the assistance of
several Naval Reserve personnel. The plan provided
technological issues, critical success factors, goals and
milestones for the program. The overall goals of the program
were specifically addressed (exhibit 1). In addition to
Farley and his staff at NAVSUP, participants from CNO, NAVSEA,
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and NAVAIR 1 were involved in the development of the strategic
plan.
The RAMP Implementation Plan was set up in conjunction
with Congressional funding. These funds were allocated based
on target dates and milestones for the RAMP program. The
milestones included the following phases: (1) Test Readiness
Review, (2) testing and acceptance, (3) production
demonstration at SCRA, and (4) production review/acceptance
and transfer of the actual RAMP cells to Navy sites (exhibit
2).
One of the long-term objectives spelled out in the RAMP
Implementation Plan was the eventual technology transfer to
civilian companies. Although the funding effort was initially
in-house at navy commands, an original RAMP goal was to
develop and distribute this new technology throughout the U.S.
industrial base. To encourage this technology transfer, all
research and development efforts would be documented in the
public domain to provide access for civilian contractors.
The scope of the RAMP program included not only the
program sponsor, NAVSUP, but both warfare communities, NAVSEA
and NAVAIR. In addition, the prime contractor, SCRA, would
work extensively with the sites selected for RAMP cell
1 CNO was responsible for all Navy functions and activities.
NAVSEA was responsible for overseeing all aspects of the Navy's
seagoing ships and weapons systems. NAVAIR was the counterpart for
NAVSEA for the aviation community.
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implementation. The strategic plan detailed an outline of the
RAMP participants and their relationships (exhibit 3).
Despite the enormity of the implementation, Farley was
certain the program was workable and pertinent to the spare
part problems in the supply system. He believed that it was
one of the best opportunities the Navy would have to provide
a real solution to the spare parts problems in the supply
system.
D. THE KEY PLAYERS
One of Farley's major challenges was to get all of the key
players in this implementation working together. The major
commands involved in implementing RAMP technology were the
funding commands (NAVSUP, NAVSEA, NAVAIR), the Inventory
Control Points (Aviation Support Office and Ships Parts
Control Center) and the sites where the RAMP cells would be
located.
The main goal of the staff at NAVSUP in supporting and
implementing the RAMP program was to facilitate the ordering
of certain spare parts. In order to do this, the implementers
had to determine where these spare parts were being procured.
The Navy's supply system is set up on three different levels
with different funding sources. First, new weapons systems
and their initial support parts are provided by NAVSEA and
NAVAIR. When the weapons system is implemented, the support
goes to the staffs at the Inventory Control Points (ICPs), who
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are responsible for providing unique spare parts for these
weapons systems. Finally, routine parts are procured at the
local level supply depots. The focus of the RAMP program was
on the spare parts procured at the ICP level.
When SCRA was first awarded the contract, NAVSUP had been
the main proponent of the RAMP program. However, once RAMP
went from a research and development program to the
establishment of actual manufacturing prototypes, most of the
funding was generated from NAVSEA, NAVAIR and the Navy's Spare
Parts Stock Fund at the two ICPs. Despite extensive funding
by NAVSEA and NAVAIR, the Navy Comptroller decided that NAVSUP
would retain implementation authority. The main reasoning
behind this decision was to maintain balance and neutrality
between the two warfare communities.
Initially, one set of key players, the staff at NAVSEA,
was reluctant to put RAMP technology into their commands,
especially the shipyards. In the early and mid-1980's,
NAVSEA's staff believed the sole mission of these commands
should be to support their local command and ship overhauls.
They did not want the shipyards to be in the business of
providing piits to the Supply system. As the program grew,
however, the staff at NAVSEA became supporters of the obvious
cost and technological benefits of the RAMP program -
particularly as they related to NAVSEA commands.
The two ICPs, Aviation Support Office (SO0) and Ship Parts
Control Center (SPCC), were the initial RAMP customers. Both
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comiands were in the NAVSUP chain of command. However, the
Commanding Officers of each ICP also had their fitness reports
countersigned by the Commanding Officers at NAVAIR and NAVSEA,
respectively. Each ICP was serving and supporting a specific
warfare specialty and there was strong loyalty among the staff
to the respective aviation and surface communities.
In addition to the major funding commands and the ICPs,
the other key players were the RAMP sites themselves. The
RAMP cells were to be located at various shipyards and
aviation depots. Several of these commands had shown interest
in RAMP technology. In some cases, the commands had already
been looking for the flexible manufacturing and CIM technology
incorporated in RAMP. In other cases, they had heard
specifically about the RAMP program and requested to be a part
of the implementation. All of the sites in which RAMP would
be implemented came under either NAVSEA or NAVAIR. The RAMP
sites would also be providing spare parts to support NAVSEA
and NAVAIR weapons systems.
Initially, the Charleston Naval Shipyard, Naval Aviation
Depot Cherry Point, and Naval Avionics Center Indianapolis
were selected for RAMP cell site implementation. Two other
sites, Naval Ordinance Station Louisville and Naval Weapons
Support Center Crane, would implement the computer systems
necessary to adapt technical data into a PDES/RAMP format.
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E. I3PLEM3NTATION
Typical of many military contracts, the actual
implementation occurred later than scheduled. From late 1990
through 1991, the RAMP cells were in the testing and
acceptance phases at the RAMP sites. It was during this
period that the ICPs began to provide bid packages to the
sites for various parts.
After the testing and acceptance phases, the transfer of
technology from the contractor (SCRA) to the RAMP site
constituted the official implementation. Although Charleston
was initially scheduled to open the first RAMP cell, Cherry
Point actually established the first site with RAMP capability
in August 1991. This was followed by Charleston in April 1992
and Indianapolis in September 1992. The two sites working on
PDES/RAMP formats implemented their RAMP computer programs in
April 1991 (Louisville) and May 1992 (Crane). A time line for
the implementation of the RAMP program is outlined in exhibit
4.
The original implementation had been scheduled so that the
sites would establish the RAMP program over a three year
period with approximately a year between the set-up at each
site. However, delays in the contract resulted in
implementation of RAMP at all sites within a 14 month period.
This caused some difficulties among the commands which were
key players in the RAMP program.
14
The major complaint about the implementation was that
NAVSUP and SCRA tried to do too much, too soon. With all of
the sites becoming active at nearly the same time, minor
problems became magnified and the entire RAMP implementation
suffered. Ron Johnson, one of the RAMP site implementation
managers, strongly believed that a single prototype RAMP site
should have been established first. Then, after most of the
problems had been worked out, the other sites should have come
on-line.
F. THE INVENTORY CONTROL POINTS
Throughout the t~sting and acceptance phases, Farley, as
the RAMP Implementation Manager, quickly became aware of
several problems. It was obvious that actually establishing
the RAMP cells at the various sites was the least of the
program's difficulties. In order for the RAMP cells to be
effective, they had to have orders and these orders had to
come from the ICPs - ASO and SPCC.
ASO was located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The
mission of the command was to provide spare part support to
fleet aviation weapons systems. SPCC, located in
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, was the counterpart to ASO for
the surface and submarine Navy. They provided spare parts and
support for seagoing weapons systems.
Farley worked with both the staffs at ASO and SPCC to set
up a specific point of contact for RAMP manufacturing - Tom
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Brown at ASO and Bob Dowell at SPCC. Both of these
individuals were to serve as a liaison for the RAMP program
between the inventory managers, contract officers, NAVSUP and
the actual RAMP sites.
Tom Brown and Bob Dowell had similar professional
backgrounds; both had worked for their respective
organizations for over 20 years. Both also took on the job of
RAMP implementation manager in addition to other duties.
Brown's background was in engineering. He had volunteered for
the job as RAMP Program Manager in 1988, supplemental to his
position as an Engineering Data Manager. Bob Dowell had
worked as an inventory manager on a variety of specific
weapons systems and the Buy Our Spares Smart (BOSS) program.
He was appointed RAMP Project Manager in 1989. In addition to
his responsibilities to the RAMP program, he was a Logistics
Management Specialist.
Each command was set up with inventory control managers
who monitor the amount of spare parts available in the supply
system. When a part was needed, these managers determined
priority (based on fleet need) and they had two options: a
competitive bid or a referral to in-house (Navy)
manufacturing. If the part was to be competitively bid, the
inventory control manager referred the part to a contract
officer, who initiated the competitive bid process. In most
cases, a referral in-house indicated there would be a problem
in trying to bid the part to civilian contractors. The usual
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problem was a lack of interest due to the small quantities to
be manufactured or the reverse engineering that would be
needed.
The RAMP program was an in-house option. Initially, Brown
and Dowell went to the inventory managers to find parts which
could be manufactured by the RAMP cells. When these parts
were found, the orders were processed according to the
command's in-house manufacturing bid procedures.
The inventory managers had a difficult time trying to use
RAMP technology. All communication was being handled through
the liaisons and the staff who were actually making the
decisions on how the parts would be obtained were not dealing
directly with the RAMP sites. Additionally, each of the ICPs
had extensive policies for the award of contracts based on
their own needs as well as Navy, DOD and Congressional
mandates. All of these created a precise and usually rigid
organizational process in which to proceed with the award of
contracts. And the RAMP program and its technology did not fit
into these standard procurement procedures.
The initial expectations for RAMP were high. Brown
believed that RAMP technology had been sold to ASO and himself
as a data product. Not only would RAMP streamline
manufacturing, he had been told, but it would help alleviate
the dearth of technical data faced by ASO inventory managers.
Brown was also dealing with some in-house prejudice to the
RAMP cells located at NAVSEA sites. Because ASO was
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supporting the aviation community, many of his colleagues did
not understand why they should feed contracts to the surface
community. There was a strong feeling that any in-house
contracts should go to the aviation supply depots.
Dowell had a different set of problems. When he first
began working with RAMP, there were difficulties getting
management and the inventory managers to accept the new
technology. Most of them believed it was another big idea
that would never actually be funded to implementation. To
overcome this initial prejudice, Dowell publicized the use of
RAMP technology throughout SPCC. As an on-going project, he
published the cost benefit ratios and lead times of various
RAMP-manufactured parts in in-house newsletters. Dowell took
every opportunity to sell the program to skeptical staff
members.
G. WHERE ARE THE PARTS?
The first major issue for the RAMP liaisons at the ICPs
was finding spare parts that fit into the RAMP scenario.
Farley was under pressure from NAVSUP to find a "sexy" part -
a part or family of parts which would demonstrate the
effectiveness of the RAMP technology. This part or parts was
needed to show not only how well the RAMP cells worked, but
how cost effective the program could be.
In looking for "sexy" parts, Farley discovered how
difficult it was to find parts for the RAMP program at all.
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There were many parts which could be made by the RAMP cell.
But in most cases, these parts were identified after the
contracts had been awarded. There was no data base of parts
that would fit into the RAMP scenario. There was no easy way
to identify parts which had unusually long lead times, were
required in small quantities, and were expensive to
manufacture. Finding parts was more of a challenge than
expected.
Both Brown and Dowell agreed: finding parts was a real
problem. It seemed the only way to find these parts was for
them to solicit suggestiens from their inventory managers -
who were actually dealing with parts that needed to be
manufactured. In some cases, they were able to find a family
of parts that would fit RAMP criteria, like the Air Launch and
Recovery Equipment (ALRE) at ASO. But both Brown and Dowell
were continually scanning through various contracts trying to
find additional parts to feed to the RAMP sites.
Farley believed that there must be an easier way to
identify parts which were candidates for RAMP. In the spring
of 1988, he awarded a small business contract to a company in
Virginia to examine all parts at ASO and SPCC. The goal was
to determine if there was standard nomenclature or data which
could identify parts as candidates for the RAMP program and
thus establish a data base for both the ICP liaisons and the
inventory managers.
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The results were disappointing. In the scan done of over
87,000 parts, only 0.6 percent could be determined to fit into
the RAMP technology. This, of course, did not help. For the
present, Farley and the RAMP sites had to rely on Brown and
Dowell to find suitable parts for bid.
H. TECHNICAL DATA
Although finding parts was a major issue, both Brown and
Dowell agreed that technical data was an even bigger issue.
The RAMP cells had been set up to manufacture parts based on
standardized parts specifications (PDES). And the technical
data needed to create a PDES format was not always available.
Many of the spare parts which ASO and SPCC were
responsible for procuring lacked complete parts specifications
- particularly on older weapons systems. These parts were
from weapons systems in which the original contracts did not
provide full technical data - usually because it was too
expensive to include in the base contract. In fact, Brown and
Dowell estimated that 65 percent of the parts ASO and SPCC
were procuring lacked complete technical data.
Most importantly, the parts which RAMP was targeting -
hard to manufacture and expensive with excessively long lead
times - were the parts which did not have adequate technical
data. And these were the spare. parts that were the real
troublemakers for inventory control and contract officers. If
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the ICP was contracting a part with full technical
information, cost and lead time was rarely a problem.
Although Brown and Dowell believed RAMP technology was
valuable, it was not what they could immediately use. It was
as if someone had come up with this great idea to help ASO and
SPCC, but forgot to ask them what they needed. What ASO and
SPCC needed was the capability to generate technical data and
reverse engineering.
I. COST, COMPETITION AND FUNDING
Although the ICPs had similar missions and some structural
similarities, they were distinctly different organizations.
In implementing RAMP, many of these differences became
apparent. Issues such as finding parts for RAMP, competition
in contracting, the cost of contracts and funding procedures
were handled in separate ways by each command.
The staff at the ICPs must work with formalized procedures
to award contracts. All contracts were to be competitively
bid with private industry with a few exceptions for in-house
manufacturing. Brown particularly felt that the issue of
competition had not been adequately addressed - at least
within ASO. The staff at ASO was still under pressure to
ensure that a set percentage (established each fiscal year by
Congress) of their contracts were competitively bid (30
percent in FY 92). And that requirement meant competitive
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bidding with civilian contractors, not competitive bids among
the RAMP sites.
Cost was another issue. RAMP bids were sometimes higher
in costs than other bids due to the advanced technology and
quick turn-around times. Despite substantially shorter lead
times, contract officers had no way to measure the value of
short lead times against the cost of the part. For example,
one of the ALRE parts, a special cable assembly (Part No.
418794-1), had a commercial based lead time of 442 days. Using
RAMP technology, the lead time would be reduced to 30 days.
However, even though NAVSUP supported the concept that long
lead times have a real dollar value, no one had come up with
a method for the contract officers to factor this into the bid
selection process.
Unlike ASO, SPCC had a different internal policy emphasis.
Lead time was often a crucial factor, particularly in
responding to CASREPs 2 . If they could get the part quickly,
contract officers usually had no problem justifying paying the
higher cost.
In many cases, it was an uphill battle to convince an
inventory manager that a particular part should go in-house
regardless of lead times and new technology. In particular,
when there was a limited amount of money to spend for a fiscal
2 CASREPs were casualty reports sent by ships to identify
weapons systems which were not fully operational. SPCC responded
to those CASREPs in which parts were identified as needed to enable
a weapons system to become operational.
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year, most inventory managers wanted to go with the least
expensive contract - regardless of lead time. At least that
would allow them more funds to spend on other items in the
short term.
Complicating the cost and )ead-time issues, were the
funding procedures for manufacturing contracts at each ICP.
Because RAMP technology was an in-house option, funding
procedures for the contracts were different from the
prccedures for competitive bids. Instead of the normal
procurement process, once an inventory manager agreed to allow
a part to be bid out to the RAMP sites, funding came out of a
different source. And, follow-up on the contract had to be
handled by the RAMP liaison or the inventory managers
themselves.
ASO and SPCC handled their funding procedures differently.
ASO often had long administrative lead times in getting
funding. SPCC, however, had instituted a dedicated team
concept in 1990 which streamlined their funding procedures.
Once an acceptable bid was returned to SPCC from a RAMP site,
Dowell was usually able to process the order quickly and with
minimum fuss.
As these issues became apparent, Farley determined that
one of the severest obstacles to RAMP was the lack of
quantitative measures to determine the value of lead time. He
discovered that several computer models had been or were being
developed for determining the cost of lead time. He began
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extensive work with the Fleet Materials Support Office (FMSO)
to find a workable computer model - one which contract
officers could use when making bid decisions.
Farley also extended his efforts with the ICPs. On
several occasions during 1991 and 1992, he went to both ASO
and SPCC to give briefs to not only the senior leadership, but
all inventory control and contract officers. He maintained
direct ties with several inventory managers as well as on-
going communication with Brown and Dowell.
Both Brown and Dowell believed that RAMP technology
provided some real answers to the Navy's supply problems, but
assimilating the program was more of challenge than they had
ever dreamed.
J. WORKLOAD CONFERENCES
Farley also realized that the bid process itself might
hinder implementation. The process was to be initiated by
both ASO and SPCC. If they had a part which fit into the RAMP
scenario - they would put together a bid package (Request for
Quote) and send it to the RAMP sites. The various RAMP sites
would make competitive (with each other) bids on the part.
These bids would be sent back to the ICP and the ICP would
then award the contract.
In 1990, prior to the RAMP cells being implemented at the
Navy sites, Farley began a series of workload conferences to
examine the bid process between the ICPs and the upcoming RAMP
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sites. These workload conferences were not a new idea - the
TCPs and Navy commands which manufactured parts and provided
repair services had previously used workload conferences to
aid the bid process. But Farley wanted to establish what, if
anything, would need to be changed with the RAMP manufacturing
process. The RAMP program managers at each ICP and
representatives from the various RAMP sites met throughout
1990 to discuss the procedures to be used to bid on parts and
award contracts.
During these conferences it became clear that the bid
process would have to be adapted to the new RAMP technology.
The conference attendees not only discussed procedures, but
actually went through the bid process with several parts to
determine what problems existed. These bids were based on the
current technology available at the future RAMP sites because
the RAMP cells had not yet been implemented. During the bid
process on these parts, it was determined that administrative
lead times for parts to go through bid procedures both at the
sites and the ICPs were excessively long (usually 150 - 200
days). This was caused by lengthy internal approval
procedures as well as the time bids spent en route in the
postal systeni. if the same bid process were used for parts
manufactured by the RAMP cells, one of the main goals of RAMP
- reduced lead time - would be negated.
The workload conferences held throughout 1990 had been
composed of different commands at different sites which were
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at varying stdges of RAMP implementation. In early 1991,
however, Farley believed it was vital to get all of the key
people at both the RAMP sites and the ICPs together to
actually establish new procedures for the bid process. In May
1991, he set up a workload conference at the Naval Avionics
Center in Indianapolis. He turned the entire conference over
to the participants. "Tell me what you want to do," Farley
told them.
The conference became a workshop. Both the sites and the
ICPs began to work on problems. The outcome was a series of
formalized procedures to establish a viable bid process.
Additionally, they addressed communication problems. With
both sides working together, the workshop participants
hammered out a process they thought would work.
The conference participants also suggested to Farley that
regular workload conferences should be held with all
participants dealing face to face. They wanted to set up a
conference where the ICPs would come with bid packages, the
sites would evaluate and bid on them, and the bids would be
awarded - all within the one-week conference. Farley agreed
to try this new system.
Farley set up a follow-on conference for August 1991 in
Pensacola, Florida. All sites and ICPs were to arrive with
bid packages. During the conference participants followed the
newly established policies and parts were bid out to one of
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the five RAMP sites. In general, most participants believed
the conference was a success.
The staff at a few of the sites, notably Ron Johnson of
the Naval Avionics Center, Indianapolis, still felt there were
a number of obstacles to be worked out. His concerns centered
around the inadequate technical data that was available, which
he thought would slow lead times down considerably. Coupled
with the fact that the ICPs were requiring firm fixed price
bids, Johnson thought there would be difficulties with the
contracts running over budget.
In general, however, most participants of the August
conference believed this was the most productive step taken by
the RAMP sites and ICPs since the beginning of the RAMP
implementation. The RAMP site personnel went back to their
commands with renewed dedication.
K. THE RAMP SITES
Farley realized the bid process was not the only problem
at the RAMP sites. The staff at the sites wanted to balance
their workload. They were also concerned with wasted effort
spent on bid packages which they did not get. The RAMP
program was only one of a variety of functions at the local
commands - and it was necessary to ensure the program had
adequate support.
Ron Johnson, the RAMP Project Officer at NAC
Indianapolis, described one of his major difficulties as
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trying to find a way to manage his workload. Because there
was not a steady workload of RAMP contracts, Johnson could not
provide consistent lead times. Bid packages came into the
command on an erratic basis, leading to bids with lead times
ranging from 4 - 14 weeks depending on his normal workload,
rather than the actual amount of manufacturing time needed to
make a part.
Johnson wanted a regular schedule and was a proponent of
long term contracts. It was a real problem for his staff to
spend a lot of time on bid packages, especially those
involving reverse engineering (anywhere from 4 - 12 weeks),
only to get a small quantity one-time bid. Additionally, the
cost of the reverse engineering could be exorbitant for a
small number of parts.
Another difficulty for the local RAMP sites was
interaction with the local commands. There were a variety of
local pressures that the RAMP site had to deal with - and not
just in terms of the technology being used for local projects.
The RAMP sites had to rely on their local command for
administrative staffing, funding for support functions, and
engineering information. The RAMP program was only one
section of the command's total responsibility. If the RAMP
cell tried to establish its own engineering, administration
and supply functions, many local "rice bowls" would be upset.
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L. THE RAMP PROGRAM - WHAT NEXT?
In November 1991, another setback occurred. Farley was
informed by Tom Brown at ASO that nearly 60 percent of the
contracts issued at the August 1991 Pensacola workload
conference had been canceled due to budget cuts. Farley knew
it was time to go back to the drawing board again.
After Farley received the phone call regarding the budget
cuts, he sat back in his chair to review the status of the
RAMP program and his goals for the future. One of Farley's
major goals in the next year was to establish a dedicated
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) system at all of the RAMP
sites and the ICPs. Communication problems had plagued the
RAMP implementation from the beginning and the contractors at
SCRA had proposed the EDI system as a solution to the
communications problems presented by the bid process.
During the spring of 1992, Tom Brown at ASO began working
on another workload conference dealing specifically with 41
parts in ALRE. To prevent budget cuts from inhibiting the
process, he wanted to reduce lead times for bids even further.
Brown worked with another member of the NAVSUP RAMP
implementation team, Alex Johnston. Johnston was a consultant
from a Washington, DC consulting organization known as PRC,
Inc. Johnston had been working with Farley on the RAMP
implementation since September 1990. Brown and Johnston set
up a different kind of conference in the summer of 1992. They
called it ALRE 41. The basic idea was to establish a workload
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conference by electronic mail. All sites were connected by
electronic mail to the ICP RAMP contacts and NAVSUP. Brown
and Johnston wanted to use this technology to facilitate the
bid process.
Brown and Johnston sent out procedures and time frames to
all sites and in July 1992, the RAMP sites and ASO attempted
their first electronic mail workload conference. All sites
participated and the conference met with limited success.
Administrative lead time for contracts was -argeted at 30 days
- the result was approximately 40 days. Although the 30 day
goal was not met, the time frame had been dramatically reduced
(from 150 days at the Pensacola conference) and Johnston and
Brown proved that the workload conferences could be
effectively conducted through an electronic mail system. The
success of ALRE 41 indicated the EDI program being promoted by
SCRA could ease some of the bid process problems.
In August 1992, a conference was held in Charleston to
discuss the EDI implementation. While most sites were
supportive, particularly after the success of ALRE 41, some
reservations were expressed. Some sites already had
electronic mail and EDI systems of some sort. They were
concerned that this would be just one more system to master.
Additionally, local commands were not always supportive of
technology just for the RAMP unit - Commanding Officers at the
local RAMP sites wanted integrated communications systems.
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There were also frustrations expressed about some of the
on-going problems in the bid process: for example, the lack of
accurate technical data and long administrative lead times.
EDI would not solve these problems - although they might make
them more obvious. EDI, while a step in the right direction,
was not the cure-all.
M. THE FUTURE OF RAMP
As Farley contemplated the results of the EDI conference
and the events of the previous year, it became clear the goals
and scope of the RAMP program were shifting. The technology
was the same, but it would have to be adapted to new
challenges.
Throughout 1992, the need for a change in direction had
become more apparent. For example, from January to June 1992,
SPCC had put together at least five bid packages per month
specifically screened for RAMP and sent to the sites for
quotes. Out of those 125 packages, the RAMP sites had
returned only ten bids.
There were a variety of reasons for the low response rate,
but most dealt with the technical data issue. Although SPCC
had included what they believed were complete parts
specifications, the sites found gaps in the technical data and
were unable to make accurate bids.
Even the success of the ALRE 41 conference in July was
limited. Although the lead time on parts that were actually
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bid had been reduced to 40 days (from an average of over 400
days), only 5 out of 41 parts presented by ASO had been bid on
by the RAMP sites. Again, this was because of incomplete
technical data and/or inaccurate or outdated parts
specifications.
Farley now had to move the RAMP implementation into a new
phase. He had to find a way to adapt the use of RAMP
technology to the current needs of its customers. Since its
initial implementation, RAMP had come a long way. But there





This plan has been specifically 'ilored to fit into the
framework of the Department of Defense (Production and
Logistics) 2010 Strategic Planning Guide.
In developing the RAMP Strategic Implementation Plan, five
basic questions are addressed:
- Why RAMP?
- What is RAMP?
- Who is and will be involved?
- Where should RAMP lead us?
- How do we get the system to that point?
The methodology used to answer these basic questions includes
a series of interrelated tasks, whose answers form this
Strategic Implementation Plan.
- The Navy is pursuing RAMP to improve productivity,
lower costs and reduce lead times for a finite population of
parts that are currently costly and difficult to obtain. For
selected part families this will allow the Navy to reduce the
depth of spares and the number of insurance items it procures.
RAMP directly supports Navy industrial activities' Total
Quality Management (TQM) initiatives. This reduction of costs
and lead times will ultimately improve fleet readiness.
- RAMP is a project to integrate manufacturing and
logistics functions using neutral nonproprietary digital
product data standards and management philosophies such as
total quality management, just in time deliveries and flexible
workforces.
- RAMP is a Navy logistics technology effort being
executed by the Naval Supply Syster~s Command for direct
application in the Naval industrial a:tivities. The prime
contractor for this effort is the South Carolina Research
Authority (SCRA).
- Success of RAMP and other related CALS efforts will
give the Navy the opportunity to create a more efficient
logistics process.
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- RAMP will open the door for the Navy to explore
technological change in a number of interfaces where better
integration offers significant paybacks. As a catalyst, RAMP
will demonstrate a commitment to DOD initiatives which will
permit industry to follow these technological directions in
future weapons systems. Interest in advanced manufacturing
technologies from RAMP and other efforts are anticipated from
afloat intermediate repair activities and will be pursued
separately.
* From the Rapid Acquisition of Manufactured Parts (pAMP)





Significant milestones for the SCRA contract through Step 2,
Lot 6 are provided below:
SMP PWA
1) Test Readiness Review (TRR)/ JUN 89 NOV 89
Parts Demonstration
2) Navy Test and Acceptance JUL 89- DEC 89-
DEC 89 MAY 90
3) Production Demonstration/ JAN 90- JUN 90-
Facilitation at Contractor's JUL 91** AUG 91**
Plant
4) Production Review/Acceptance FEB 91 AUG 91
5) Transfer to Navy Sites/IOC
NADEP Cherry Point OCT 90-
SEP 91**
NAC Indianapolis SEP 91-
MAR 92**
NSY Charleston MAR 93-
SEP 93**
** End Dates dependent on Military Construction (MCON)
completion at sites.
* From the Rapid Acquisition of Manufactured Parts (RAMP)




SCOPE OF RAMP PARTICIPANTS




I P qOONAMI MANAGE I I
NAVSEA NAVSUP NAVAIR
NSY INADEP MNAC
I CHARLESTON CHERRY POINT 1 INDIANAPOLIS
SUWP Prime. Contractor SMPI
SII _
C c~u SCRA ICELL pya
CELL
* From the Rapid Acquisition of Manufactured Parts (RAMP)
Strategic Implementation Plan, 1989-2010.
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EXHIBIT 4
TIME LINE FOR RAMP IMPLDENTATION
1982-1985 SCRA developed RAMP concept and lobbied for
Navy contract.
Fall 1985 SCRA awarded Research and Development Letter
Contract.
DEC 1987 Current RAMP contract awarded to SCRA to
establish RAMP computer cells at selected
sites.
Spring 1988 Farley awarded Small Business Contract to
local Virginia company to try to establish
RAMP part data base.
MAR 1989 Rapid Acquisition of Manufactured Parts
Strategic Plan 1989-2010 forwarded to
Congress.
1990-1991 Workload conferences held at various upcoming
RAMP sites to analyze bid process procedures.
APR 1991 Louisville PDES/RAMP computer site
implemented.
MAY 1991 Workload conference at NAC, Indianapolis to
establish bid process procedures and time
frames.
AUG 1991 Cherry Pt. RAMP cell implemented.
AUG 1991 Workload conference, Pensacola.
NOV 1991 ASO parts from August conference (60%)
canceled due to budget cuts.
JAN-MAY 1991 SPCC prepares approximately 125 bid packages
for 1992 RAMP sites, ten bids received back
from sites.
APR 1992 Charleston RAMP cell implemented.
MAY 1992 Crane PDES/RAMP computer site implemented.
JUL 1992 Electronic workload conference, ALRE 41.
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AUG 1992 EDI conference, Charleston, SC.
SEPT 1992 Indianapolis RAMP cell implemented.
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III. TEACHING NOTES
LEARNING OBJECTIVES. This case was designed to enable a
student to analyze the implementation of a new technological
application. The implementation involved a variety of Navy
commands or organizations, some of whom have completely
distinct missions. It is therefore necessary for the student
to evaluate the implementation of the program within
particular commands and also its overall success or failure as
a Navy program. Each of the following issues are topics that
can be developed from information contained in the case.
1. The success or failure of the implementation and how the
success or failure is defined.
2. How the new program was implemented into the current
management control system and how the management control
system and organizational process affected the
implementation.
3. "Customer" needs and how to address them.
4. Problems inherent in implementing any type of program
across several different organizations.
5. The importance of adequate communication and
communication systems in a newly implemented program.
6. Comparison of expectations of a new program with actual
outcomes.
7. The need to remain flexible with a new program and shift
and adjust goals as necessary.
8. Support from senior officials and involvement in
implementaticn planning by all participants.
9. Establishment of a management control system (especially
feedback mechanisms) to monitor implementation.
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10 The need for careful, complete and flexible planning
prior to implementation to ensure success.
A. IMMEDIATE ISSUE
The immediate issue of this case is focused on the actions
of Barney Farley, NAVSUP Ramp Project Manager, who was in
charge of a program which was having difficulty in meeting the
expectations of its developers and supporters. This program
was executed over five years with high expectations. These
expectations were generated from the supporting organization
(NAVSUP) as well as Congressional supporters (who provided the
funding) and the South Carolina Research Group (who developed
the RAMP technology). The implementation, however, has not
fulfilled these expectations. There were two major symptoms
(both interrelated) that indicate the implementation of the
RAMP program was falling short of expectations: low
utilization of the local facilities, and a lack of orders from
the Inventory Control Points (ICPs). The low utilization
rate was the major symptom of the implementation problems -
the technology was not being fully used. In conjunction with
this - actually a reason for this - was that the ICPs were not
awarding contracts to the facilities at the rate originally
intended. Although the issues of the case deal with past
strategies of implementation, solutions must focus on the
future - what to do given the actions of the past.
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B. UNDERLYING ISSUES
The underlying issues focus mainly on the interactions of
the actual RAMP sites with the Inventory Control Points (ICPs)
- primarily because they were the customers of RAMP. In
implementing RAMP technology, issues such as strategic
planning, the needs of the customers, and the
interrelationships of the various commands involved must be
addressed. No matter how good the technology - if it did not
address the customer's needs AND if it was not incorporated
into the existing organization's procedures - it was a
questionable use of scarce resources. These issues fell into
five main areas: strategic planning, customer needs,
organizational policy, bid procedures and the communication
process.
1. Strategic Planning
One of the problems with this implementation was the
lack of planning. The formal implementation plan, while
covering many topics, lacked one vital item: which commands
would be using this technology to manufacture parts and what
exactly did they need. Exhibit (3) which outlines the scope
of RAMP participants did not include the ICPs. Yet, it was
the staff of the ICPs which would be generating the orders for
parts manufactured by the RAMP program.
Another failure was the lack of participation by
commands involved in the RAMP implementation other than
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NAVSUP. Many specific issues that became problems during the
implementation (e.g. finding parts, lack of technical data)
may have been identified. A wider scope of involvement by the
RAMP participants may have generated solutions to many of the
eventual problems which came up during the implementation.
Additionally, there was an apparent lack of ongoing
strategic planning throughout the implementation. After the
formal strategic plan was published, there was apparently
little other planning. It appeared that problems were
addressed as they came up, with solutions generated quickly.
When the implementation was accelerated and all sites came on
line within approximately one year, there was little time to
determine and use any of the "lessons learned" from the other
sites. The EDI system proposed by SCRA might have also fallen
into this category.
Another planning issue involved the wide variety of
participants in the RAMP program implementation. All of the
commands (NAVSUP, ICPs, RAMP sites) who participated in this
implementation had different missions and were responsible to
different bosses. NAVSUP's main concern was to alleviate and
ease supply problems, in this case, the expensive cost of
small lot spare parts. NAVSUP was directly responsible to the
CNO. The ICPs were responsible to NAVSUP but also had
indirect, but strong, ties to NAVSEA and NAVAIR whose main
mission was to keep the Navy's air and surface forces in a
high state of readiness. NAVSEA and NAVAIR were also both
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directly responsible to the CNO. Finally, the RAMP sites were
responsible to the individual shipyards or naval stations
where they were located who, in turn, were in the NAVSEA or
NAVAIR chain of command.
The missions of these commands varied, but all the
commands needed to work together to make the RAMP program
productive and cost-effective. These widely varying missions
made communication and working together difficult at times.
The physical aspects of communication are scheduled to be
improved through the EDI implementation. But EDI would not
necessarily ensure that all the commands would work together
despite their different goals.
2. Customer Needs
One of the basic flaws of the implementation was the
failure to address customer (ICP) needs. While the technology
itself was impressive and the goals were admirable, actual
customer needs were not specifically addressed. Basically,
the designers of RAMP technology produced a technology that
was to address the problems they thought existed in the
procurement of spare parts. However, the ICPs (who were
actually purchasing and dealing with the spare parts) had
different problems. A major stumbling block that was
discovered as the program was implemented was finding parts
which fit the parameters of RAMP. In trying to find these
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parts, one of the most important deficiencies was uncovered:
the lack of adequate technical data on parts.
In general, the parts identified for RAMP were spare
parts which were expensive to make in small lot sizes - but
were only needed in small amounts. The overall goal of RAMP
was to provide a cost-effective method of producing spare
parts in small lots. However, the implementers at NAVSUP and
the ICPs discovered that it was difficult to identify which
specific parts should be produced using RAMP technology. When
the RAMP program was initiated, it was left up to the customer
(the ICP) to determine what parts "fit" the technology.
Finding parts turned out to be more difficult to
determine than anticipated by the implementers of RAMP at
NAVSUP and SCRA. At one point, a small contractor was hired
to attempt to identify a listing of all parts which would fall
into the RAMP technology parameters but the task proved
difficult and unwieldy. As a result, the points of contact at
each ICP had to sift through thousands of parts specifications
and attempt to identify those which could be made at the RAMP
facilities - going outside the normal procurement process.
In essence, the customer was being asked to identify
RAMP parts and then "feed" these parts into the local RAMP
sites. Instead of the new technology responding to the needs
of the customer, the customer was trying to fit their needs
into the available technology.
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Technical data was perhaps the most important issue
faced by the implementers of RAMP. As the program was
implemented, it was determined that nearly sixty-five percent
of the parts at the ICPs did not have adequate technical data.
RAMP was designed to make parts using full technical data.
What the staff at the ICP needed was the capability to
generate full technical data given a particular part -
essentially, reverse engineering. The staff of the ICP needed
to be able to send a part which had incomplete or outdated
technical data to a Navy (rather than commercial) site. The
site would conduct reverse engineering by the part and create
the data to allow the part to be manufactured.
This need for technical data was often in conflict
with the actual manufacturing process - and manufacturing was
the original intent of RAMP, not reverse engineering. But
ultimately, the RAMP implementation needed to address the
customer's needs.
3. Organizational Policy
In implementing RAMP, there were several
organizational issues that caused conflict. Internal policies
and culture at the two ICPs were often completely different.
Competition in contracting (between commercial contractors as
well as commercial vs. government facilities) was an issue
which appeared to have been inadequately addressed. There
were several very precise regulations and laws that government
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activities MUST adhere to in awarding contracts. Although one
of the goals of the RAMP technology was to provide SMP/PWA in
small lot quantities more cost-effectively than commercial
vendors, RAMP bids were not made in competition with
commercial activities. When RAMP technology was initiated, it
was implemented as an in-house (Navy) option. The ICPs,
therefore, had to find reasons to keep RAMP bids out of the
competitive arena.
Another consideration that apparently was not
adequately addressed was the lead time versus cost issue. One
of the major advantages of RAMP technology was the vastly
reduced lead time for building these parts. However, the cost
for parts with short turn-around times was larger than
commercial costs with substantially longer lead times (60 days
vs. 400 days). This was due to the fact that the computerized
technology itself was more advanced and therefore more
expensive. While the hidden costs of long lead times had been
acknowledged by the procurement commands (ICPs), they had not
been incorporated into the decision-making structure of the
procurement process. If these hidden costs were not taken
into consideration, RAMP technology would often provide higher
cost bids for parts. Thus, even if the points of contact had
found spare parts which fit the RAMP mold, the contracts would
not be awarded because the bids were higher than the
traditional commercial bids. Additionally, there was the
issue of immediate availability of dollars. If there was not
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a high priority on the need for the part, an inventory control
officer might choose to spend funds on the low dollar source
regardlecss of lead time. This allowed remaining funds to be
spent on other needs. This makes economic sense for the
inventory managers and adversely affected the selection of
RAMP technology for certain parts.
The two ICPs - ASO and SPCC - were also very different
in their approach to awarding contracts. Each had different
policies on competition, cost, and funding procedures. ASO
wanted all parts possible to be bid competitively, considered
cost more important than lead time, and had an complex payment
system for RAMP contracts. SPCC, on the other hand, was more
relaxed on the competition issue, considered lead time over
cost when down systems were interfering with readiness, and
funded the contracts relatively quickly once the bid was
accepted. These different policies were acknowledged by
Farley but proved difficult to resolve.
Finally, there was a more poiitical issue with ASO:
traditionally their internal contracts had gone to aviation
commands - however, most RAMP facilities were located at
NAVSEA commands. Awarding contracts to these facilities may
have caused some uncomfortable feelings related to a




In implementing the use of RAMP technology, the
planners at NAVSUP and SCRA failed to ensure that it was
incorporated into the existing procurement organizations.
RAMP technology and its use was outside the current
procurement system. In the initial implementation, the value
of the new technology provided by the RAMP program was
prominently emphasized and there was extensive discussion by
the contractors (SCRA) and the planners at NAVSUP on how the
technology would work and where the RAMP facilities would be
set up and financed. However, one of the crucial questions
was not addressed. How to get the orders? Even though the
technology was dereloped to ease problems with expensive,
small lot spare parts, little or no consideration was given to
how the procurement system handled or used this new
technology.
Basically, the initial implementation did not weigh
the factor of how the (admittedly cumbersome) procurement
process would be able to use this technology. In fact, this
aspect was not considered as a major factor in the
implementation process. Barney Farley understood the need for
support of the ICPs and took a variety of steps to ensure that
support and cooperation. This included making presentations
to inventory control officers, ensuring specialized
coordinators existed within each organization and briefing
top-level officers.
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However, integrating RAMP into the process of awarding
contracts was not pa.t of the implementation plan - either
initially or at a later date. The actual bid process did not
allow RAMP technology to be easily accessed as an option.
When RAMP technology became available for certain types of
spare parts, it was essential that the procurement process be
adapted so that the inventory control officers could easily
avail themselves of this new option.
In order to use RAMP technology, methods of going
"around the system" were established by both ICPs. For
example, Farley set up two points of contact (RAMP program
managers) within each of the ICPs. These individuals were to
provide information and generate orders for the RAMP program.
But, these points of contact were actually outside the
procurement awards process. They each were responsible for
other functions within the organization. Instead of RAMP
technology being an automatic option for inventory control
officers (given certain pre-conditions), the points of contact
had to solicit parts from these inventory control officers.
Basically, the use of RAMP technology remained completely
outside the procurement process.
The bids for RAMP technology were outside the system
and this was a disincentive for inventory control officers to
award bids to RAMP sites. These disincentives were created
because the funding process itself had to be adapted. At both
SPCC and ASO, any bid awarded to a RAMP facility had to go
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through a separate in-house processing procedures to be
funded. Additionally, with a RAMP bid - because the funding
was different - the inventory control officer or RAMP liaison
retained responsibility for follow-up. Usually, follow-up was
conducted by a separate department. Because the internal
processes of the ICPs were not adapted to RAMP technology, it
was difficult and cumbersome to award contracts to RAMP sites.
The fact that a number of contracts had actually been awarded
was attributable to the effort of the RAMP program managers at
the ICPs and the diligent inventory control officers who
realized the value of RAMP technology despite the lack of an
institutionalized award system.
5. Communication
Communication was also a major problem from the
beginning of the implementation. The main difficulty in the
communication process existed because there were so many
"players" involved with differing goals. This caused
communication problems due to the actual physical problems of
communicating as well as the fact that the commands had
different missions and chain of commands. However, the
proposed solution, an EDI system, might also have its own
problems.
The physical problems of communication between the
RAMP sites and their customers (the ICPs) existed primarily
due to wide geographical separation. ASO and SPCC were
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located in Philadelphia and Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania,
respectively, while the RAMP sites were spread throughout the
eastern U.S. from South Carolina to Indiana. Paperwork
(including the required Request For Quote) for orders had to
go through the mail. Even with phone calls to ease the
process, delays were common. One solution to this was the
establishment of workload conferences where the entire bid
process was completed during the one-week conference - but
these conferences were not always successful.
The proposed solution to these communication problems
was the implementation of an EDI system. This solution was
spearheaded by SCRA but there were doubts about the
effectiveness of the system by some of the participants.
First, many local sites already had some form of EDI and did
not want a separate EDI system just for RAMP. Secondly, it
might not solve many of the existing problems - such as
merging the missions between different commands (i.e., the
ICPs and the RAMP sites). Additionally, EDI would not solve
the local administrative delays (especially given that the
entire cycle for an order was as long as 150 to 200 days at
times). However, the system would promote faster
communication processes and perhaps identify existing problems
more clearly. The big issue might be similar to that of the
implementation of the RAMP program itself: Is the
implementation thoroughly planned and does it have the support
of all the participants?
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C. PROPOSED STUDY QUESTIONS
1. Was the implementation of the RAMP program successful?
Why or why not?
2. Were the steps Barney Farley took to implement the RAMP
program adequate? What else should he have done? What
should he avoided?
3. What kind of management control program did Farley use
to track the implementation? Could he have done
anything else?
4. What were the main issues for the staffs at the
Inventory Control Points? What were the main issues for
the RAMP sites? How were these issues resolved?




The purpose of a management case study is to provide a
written account of an actual situation in which students can
examine the facts of the case, analyze actions taken and
propose solutions for the future. The RAMP implementation
provides a myriad of issues for analysis and discussion. This
implementation of a new technology affords the opportunity to
examine strategic planning and management controls relating to
factors such as strategic planning, customer needs, work flow
processes and communication.
One of the important issues was the planning for the
implementation of RAMP. The formal implementation plan was
developed by the staffs at NAVSUP and the other funding
commands with little or no input from other participants in
the RAMP program. This led to some of the eventual
implementation problems. Customer needs were not examined
adequately during the evolution of the program. Many of these
needs, as well as the procedures for bidding on parts, were
not completely addressed during the planning stages. It is
interesting to note that the formal implementation plan did
not include the Inventory Control Points (ICPs) in the scope
of participants.
Customer needs were not addressed adequately in the
planning stages. The implementation planning failed to
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address specific customer (ICP) needs. This did not become
apparent until the RAMP cells actually began manufacturing.
First, finding parts which fit into the RAMP scenario -
difficult to manufacture, small quantities and long lead times
- was much more difficult than anticipated. Secondly, once
the parts were found, the parts specifications did not always
have adequate technical data which the RAMP cell needed to
manufacture the part. Neither of these issues were foreseen
and therefore were not addressed in the planning stages.
However, if the ICPs, as the initial customers of RAMP, had
been involved in the early planning stages, these issues might
have been addressed earlier.
Another group of issues surrounded the actual bid process.
Each ICP had a specific person, the RAMP Program Manager, who
served as a liaison between the staff at the ICP and the RAMP
sites to facilitate the bid process. The RAMP program was
not a normal option for the inventory control officers (who
monitored the need for spare parts) and each RAMP liaison
needed to actually search for parts to feed to the RAMP sites.
Additionally, the issue of competition in contracting was a
problem - using RAMP technology required the staff at the ICP
to justify using in-house bid procedures vice civilian
contractors. Cost was also an issue. While RAMP could vastly
reduce lead times, its cost was usually also higher. There
was no set mechanism at the ICP to justify the additional cost
as a trade-off against excessive lead times. Getting bids to
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and from the RAMP sites through both commands administrative
procedures also caused difficulties and extended lead times.
The bid process was not adapted to the new technology provided
by the RAMP program.
A final issue was the communication problem. The
implementation process had continual communication problems.
These included the more mundane, such as delays resulting from
mailing bids to and from different geographical locations, to
the more complex, such as a lack of direct communication
between those who needed the parts and those who were
manufacturing them. Communication was also difficult due to
the different missions and responsibilities of the commands
involved in the program.
The RAMP program is a good example of trying to implement
a program in a large organization with many interrelated
factions. This is never easy and it is apparent that planning
is imperative. But the other element that is necessary is
flexibility. With an implementation so large and diverse, the
staff involved must be flexible and willing to adapt to new
situations as they arise.
The developers of the RAMP program started out with a goal
of simplifying and accelerating the manufacture of certain
hard-to-get spare parts. But the program has evolved into a
flexible manufacturing program which provides reverse
engineering to establish viable technical data on certain
spare parts. The manufacturing process has apparently become
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secondary. The staff at NAVSUP, the ICPs, and the RAMP sites
who were implementing RAMP have had to demonstrate enormous
flexibility to be able to shift the emphasis of the entire
program.
Finally, the implementation of the RAMP program is not
just a case about how to implement a new program. It is a
case about how to deal with new technology. New technology
can provide a variety of innovative and different ways of
conducting business - some of which will not be discovered
until after implementation. New technology may also demand a
change in the status quo - current procedures may be
ineffective with new technological advances. The key is
thorough planning combined with flexibility.
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